The improper delegation of the arbitrator’s personal function to artificial intelligence as grounds for annulment of the arbitral award

Abstract

The primary aim of this article is to determine whether delegating the decision-making function of arbitrators to a generative artificial intelligence system constitutes grounds for the annulment of an arbitral award. To achieve this purpose, a dogmatic and analytical methodology is employed, focusing on the analysis of the Peruvian Arbitration Law (in accordance with the UNCITRAL Model Law). This is complemented by a review of recent international case law, with particular emphasis on Canadian jurisprudence in Association des ressources intermédiaires d’hébergement du Québec v. Santé Québec. The findings of this analysis demonstrate that, while the use of AI is entirely valid as an organizational support tool during the proceedings, delegating decision-making completely violates the intuitu personae nature of the arbitral function. Furthermore, it severely infringes upon the right to due process, particularly the fundamental guarantee of a reasoned decision. Consequently, it is concluded that surrendering this strictly personal duty to a machine represents an unacceptable departure from the parties’ original agreement, thus unquestionably justifying the annulment of the award.